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IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The City of Madison, Wisconsin, enacted an ordinance1 pro-
hibiting the sale of milk there, unless it was processed and bottled
at an approved pasteurization plant, located within five miles of
the central square of Madison. Appellant, an Illinois corporation,
was refused a license to sell milk in that city because its plants
were located outside the five mile radius (actually situated in the
State of Illinois) and here seeks a declaratory judgment as to the
constitutionality of the ordinance. Ten times the amount of milk
required by the area was produced within the restricted zone, but
no milk labeled "Grade A" by United States Public Health Service
standards was distributed in Madison. The milk which appellant
seeks to sell is labeled "Grade A" by Chicago authorities, whose
standards, as adopted, are those of the United States Public Health
Service. Held, the ordinance places a discriminatory burden on
interstate commerce and is unnecessary for the protection of local
health interests, reasonable and adequate alternatives being avail-
able. Such a regulation would invite a multiplication of preferen-
tial trade areas destructive of the very purpose of the commerce
clause. Dean Milk Company v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 71
S. Ct. 295 (U.S. 1951).
There was no federal legislation with which the ordinance
might conflict, nor was there any dispute as to the avowed purpose
of the enactment 2-a health law. It was granted that the city
might legislate on the subject matter in the interest of safety,
health and well being of the community, even though interstate
commerce be thereby affected.8 But because of "reasonable alter-
natives" the Court deemed local interest so slight that the burden
on interstate commerce prevailed. Thus was created an additional
restriction on the powers of the states to legislate in the field
1. General Ordinance of the City of Madison, 1949, § 7.21. Another ordi-
nance (§ 7.11) was challenged in its provision relieving municipal authorities
from the duty to inspect farms located beyond twenty-five miles from the
center of the city. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin ordered this complaint
dismissed for want of a justiciable controversy, after decision on Section 7.21
was reached.




affecting interstate commerce; heretofore, the "reasonable alter-
natives" concept was not applied to commerce. 4
With the case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of PhiLa-
delphia5 the Court dedicated itself to a process of contrasting local
benefit with interstate commerce burden. The original doctrine
still effective today,7 the modern version being disclosed8 in South-
ern Pacific Company v. Arizona,9 as: "in the absence of conflicting
legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state
to make laws governing matters of local concern which neverthe-
less in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some
extent, regulate it."
There are certain factors, exclusive of the innovation of the
instant case, which have determined, generally, the Court's deci-
sion in a particular case. If a state statute has for its purpose the
protection of public health, safety and welfare, 0 and is not in-
tended to protect local economic interests by excluding or discrim-
inating against the industry of other states;" or if the statute is
4. The Court refused to invoke the "reasonable alternative" restriction to
protect freedom of speech. Feiner v. New York, 71 S. Ct. 303 (U.S. 1951), but
did utilize it to protect First Amendment rights. Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
5. 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
6. "Now the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, contain-
ing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their
nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule . .. and some...
as imperatively demanding that diversity." Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens,
53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851).
7. In California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 116 (1941), Justice Stone wrote
for the Court, "The decision in the Di Santo case was a departure from this
principle which has been recognized since Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens,
supra. It cannot be reconciled with later decisions of this Court which have
likewise recognized and applied the principle, and it can no longer be regarded
as controlling authority."
8. So said the Court in California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
9. 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945).
10. Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina Board of Agriculture, 171 U.S.
345 (1898) (fertilizer); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912) (food for animals);
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913) (labelling); Weigle v. Curtice
Bros., 248 U.S. 285 (1919) (prohibition of sale of food products containing
benzoate of soda); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919)(formula disclosure); Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183 (1937) (cos-
metics).
11. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) (sale of fresh meat prohibited
unless from animals inspected in the state within twenty-four hours before
slaughter); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891) (sale of fresh meat
slaughtered one hundred miles or more from place of sale prohibited until
inspected locally); Voight v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62 (1891) (sale of flour brought
into state prohibited until inspected); Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935)(in which Justice Cordozo wrote for the Court, "Neither the power to tax nor
the police power may be used by the state of destination with the aim and
effect of establishing an economic barrier against competition with the prod-
ucts of another state or the labor of its residents." [294 U.S. 511, 527]); Hale
v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1939) (inspection of cement imported from
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reasonably adapted to the end in view 12 and has as its text the
regulation of an activity essentially local in nature,13 then its
validation is imminent.
The protection of public health by state enactment has been
a decidedly influential factor, the Court upholding laws concern-
ing prohibition of sale of a skimmed milk product, 14 quarantine of
infected sheep, 15 transportation of dead animals, 6 prohibition of
artificially colored coffee,'17 and quarantine and inspection fees for
incoming ships.'8 Even when the-health legislation has completely
stopped the stream of commerce,'9 it has been upheld.
As to the protection of local economic interests at the expense
of other states, the Court concluded: "Any pretense or masquer-
ade will be disregarded, and the true purpose of the statute ascer-
tained. '20 In H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond,21 which possibly fore-
shadowed the decision in the Dean case, the Supreme Court, after
concluding that the law had discrimination for its purpose, dis-
carded the juristic balancing process and peremptorily invalidated
the statute.
A striking illustration of the reasonableness of state enact-
ments is the Georgia "blow-post" law, which required trains to
stop at all grade crossings. This statute was adjudged valid as a
safety measure;22 but seven years later, when evidence was intro-
duced proving the delays to be disproportionate to the safety
achieved, the statute was invalidated. 28 Also, in Southern Pacific
Company v. Arizona2 4 sufficient facts are presented in the opinion
a foreign country); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525
(1949).
12. In South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., Inc.,
303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938), Justice Stone wrote that "judicial function, under the
commerce clause ... stops with the inquiry whether the state legislature...
has acted within its province, and whether the means of regulation chosen are
reasonably adapted to the end sought."
13. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. 299 (1851);
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
14. Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919).
15. Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U.S. 198 (1901).
16. Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939).
17. Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U.S. 189 (1904).
18. Morgan's S.S. Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U.S. 455 (1886).
19. Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Board of
Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) (preventing landing of all passengers where epi-
demic exists at port of entry); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905) (dam
across navigable waterway).
20. Smith v. St. Louis and S.W.R.R., 181 U.S. 248, 257 (1901). See also
Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890).
21. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
22. Southern Ry. v. King, 217 U.S. 524 (1910).
23. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917).
24. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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to reveal the approach of the Court in ascertaining whether or
not the legislation should be upheld as accomplishing beneficial
results.25
When the Court decides that an activity requires uniformity
of action, state statutes may be invalidated for that reason alone.26
However, some contradictory cases have cast considerable doubt
on the outcome of certain litigation of state statutes. The Court,
after balancing the conflicting interests, allowed the State of Cali-
fornia to protect local raisin interests at the expense of other states
in Parker v. Brown,27 even though ninety-five per cent of the
raisins consumed in this country are produced in California. In
Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products,28 the Court per-
mitted another discriminatory economic regulation. Pennsylvania
milk dealers were required to pay producers the prices prescribed
by the Milk Control Board with the inevitable effect of raising the
price of milk shipped interstate. It was stressed that only a small
fraction of Pennsylvania milk was shipped interstate-but the
volume was considerable, nevertheless. Both of these cases com-
promised the previous certainty with which state discriminatory
legislation was invalidated. That previous certainty was some-
what reestablished, however, in H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond.29
There the Court invalidated a New York statute, which would
have precluded the interstate shipment of New York milk, because
the already short milk supply of Troy, New York, would be further
reduced by a destructive competitive situation created by the
statute. Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Incorporated,0 cited in Hood
v. DuMond, forbade the application of a New York statute which
would have regulated the price of milk paid to farmers in Ver-
mont. As opposed to the Hood case, the state and national interests
were balanced before a conclusion was reached.
The national-local commerce concept has also been the subject
of contradictions. In South Carolina State Highway Department
25. This decision, however, was not based upon reasonableness, but upon
the national-local commerce concept.
26. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
27. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Although the decision was substantially influenced
by the cooperation of the Secretary of Agriculture in lending money in sup-
port of the California program, the effect of the decision was to permit
economic discrimination. The Court sought to classify the raisin industry as
intrastate, but this characterization has lost its effect In determining whether
or not a state may regulate. See Houston, East & West Texas Ry. v. United
States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
28. 306 U.S. 346 (1939).
29. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
30. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
1951]
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v. Barnwell Brothers31 the Court upheld a state statute regulating
the width and weight of trucks, even though the limitation ex-
cluded trucks of a size not unusual in interstate commerce. Such
transportation is clearly national in nature. Also, in Parker v.
Brown,3 2 the raisin industry was far removed from concepts of
"local" characterization, but the state restriction was upheld. 8
Regulation for public health, safety, and welfare, coupled
with reasonable adaptation of the statute to such ends, previously
,had predetermined almost certain validation of state legislation
by the Supreme Court.3 4 But the Hood and Dean cases have ar-
rested or halted this tendency. The "reasonable alternatives"
restriction has increased the Court's discretionary power in invali-
dating state statutes.3 5
It is interesting to note the circumstances which probably
caused the initiation of the "reasonable alternatives" restriction
in the instant case. Annual expenditures for milk and milk prod-
ucts have made America's dairy industry the foremost part of
agricultural endeavor.86 Because of the absence of federal regula-
tion, the burden thereby devolves upon states and cities. State
police measures, relating to milk, which seek to protect consumer
health and prevent fraud on the consumer, have been upheld quite
consistently, 7 thus Balkanizing the field. The dairy industry pro-
vided the Court with a prime opportunity, if not inducement, to
strike down legislation of a state because that state could exercise
its police power with less discrimination.
A recent article on the problems involved in state regulation
of the milk industry includes a statement which presaged the
introduction of "reasonable alternatives" restrictions in the Dean
case. "If trade barriers were necessarily involved in these meas-
ures for protecting public health, there would be no valid ground
for advocating their elimination. They would be a cheap price to
31. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
32. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
33. The Court has held in other cases that subjects which are national in
nature may be regulated by states. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S.
33 (1940); Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941); California v.
Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941); Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 (1941);
Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946).
34. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) is a terminal example of such
validation.
35. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
36. See Note, 3 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 494 (1935) for a discussion of the prob-
lems of the dairy industry. See also, Burtis, Barriers and the Milk Industry,
16 Ind. L.J. 191 (1940).
37. For collections of cases see 18 A.L.R. 235 (1922); 42 A.L.R. 556 (1926);
58 A.L.R. 672 (1929); 80 A.L.R. 1225 (1932); 101 A.L.R. 64 (1936); 110 A.L.R. 644
(1937); 119 A.L.R. 243 (1939); 155 A.L.R. 1383 (1945).
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pay for the prevention of serious outbreaks of disease. For-
tunately, this is not the choice that confronts us. The true choice
is between public health regulations that have a trade-barrier
aspect and equally effective regulations that do not."38
The multiple burdens of state and local regulations are illus-
trated in this statement from the report of the Federal Trade Com-
mission: "Usually each State, subdivision of a State, and munici-
pality, insists on making its own inspection and will not accept
inspections by authorities of other jurisdictions. Operators of
country receiving plants and farmers supplying them sometimes
find it necessary to submit to as many as seven or more separate
inspections. '39
However, statements in the opinion of South Carolina State
Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers40 are opposed to the
utilization of the "reasonable 'alternatives" restriction in com-
merce. There the Court said, "And in reviewing a state highway
regulation where Congress has not acted, a court is not called
upon, as are state legislatures, to determine what, in its judgment,
is the most suitable restriction to be applied of those that are pos-
sible, or to choose that one which in its opinion is best adapted
to all the diverse interests affected... . When the action of a Legis-
lature is within the scope of its power, fairly debatable questions
as to its reasonableness, wisdom and propriety are not for the
determination of courts, but for the legislative body, on which
rests the duty and responsibility of decision.... It is not any the
less a legislative power committed to the states because it affects
interstate commerce, and courts are not any the more entitled,
because interstate commerce is affected, to substitute their own
for the legislative judgment." The Dean case raises questions as
to the Court's procedure in future cases. One interpretation of
the decision would be that the use of the "reasonable alternatives"
test was nothing more than an exercise of the usual method of
contrasting national interest against that of the state, with the
former prevailing. Cities Service v. Peerless Oil & Gas Com-
pany,41 decided subsequent to the Dean case, gives credence to this
38. Burtis, supra note 36, at 193.
39. Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distribution
of Milk and Milk Products, New York Milk Sales Area, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.,
House Doc. 95 (1937) 3.
40. 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938).
41. 71 S. Ct. 215 (U.S. 1951). There the Court allowed the State of Okla-
homa to regulate the taking of natural gas from a common source of supply,
though there was an impact on interstate commerce resulting therefrom. The
Court said, "The only requirements consistently recognized have been that
the regulation not discriminate against or place an embargo on interstate
1951]
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interpretation. It is possible, however, that the novel language of
"reasonable alternatives" has provided a method for carte blanche
invalidation of state statutes, undercutting the time-honored for-
mula of the Cooley case.42 Even though the Cities Service case
minimizes this possibility, a case with a fact situation similar to
the Dean case might well attract the Court to utilize "reasonable
alternatives," thereafter its expansion into doctrine being but a
matter of judicial discretion. Such an eventuality would be a
usurpation of legislative function by the judiciary.
William H. Parker
EFFECT OF RESPONSIVE VERDICT STATUTE-
INDICTMENTS-FORMER JEOPARDY
On February 11, 1948, defendant was indicted for manslaugh-
ter. The following week a jury of twelve returned a verdict of
negligent homicide, which was responsive to the charge of man-
slaughter at that time.' The conviction and sentence were set
aside on June 15, 1948, and the case was remanded for a new
trial.2 Some twenty months later, on February 13, 1950, defen-
dant was arraigned under the same indictment, but only on the
charge of negligent homicide. His counsel objected to the arraign-
ment, protesting that there was no written charge accusing him
of negligent homicide for the reason that negligent homicide was
no longer responsive to, nor included in, a charge of manslaugh-
ter.3 This objection was overruled, along with the subsequent
objections to the clerk's reading of the manslaughter indictment,
with the negligent homicide verdict endorsed on the back, to the
jury, and the court's permitting the jury to retire to the jury
room with the indictment and prior conviction endorsed thereon.
Held, that it was proper to arraign defendant under the original
manslaughter indictment, and try him for negligent homicide.
State v. Crittenden, 49 So. 2d 418 (La. 1950).
The appellant's contention that the use of the original indict-
ment with the endorsement of the negligent homicide verdict
commerce, that it safeguard an obvious state interest, and that the local
interest at stake outweigh whatever national interest there might be in the
prevention of state restrictions." (71 S. Ct. 215, 220.) This opinion was written
by Mr. Justice Clark, as was that of the Dean case.
42. 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
1. Art. 386, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, as amended by La. Act 147 of
1942.
2. State v. Crittenden, 214 La. 81, 36 So. 2d 645 (1948).
3. Art. 386, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, as amended by La. Act 161 of
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